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Is Exchange Risk Hedgable?
It is now about 15 years since the world
abCllldonedthe Bretton vvoodssystem of fixed
exchange rates. The debate over the advantages
of fixed vs. flexible rates will doubtless continue
for many years as exchange rates continue to be
highly volatile (see chart). Among the issues in
this debate are the extent to which different
exchange rate regimes promote or hinder
international trade and investment and the
impact of different regimes on the stability of
prices, employment, investment, and interest
rates.
Perhaps the major criticism of flexible exchange
rates has been that they impose exchange risk
on economic agents, especially importers,
exporters, and international investors. Exchange
risk refers to loss associated with unexpected
movements in international exchange rates.
Opponents of flexible rates claim that exchange
rate fluctuations comprise a major deterrent to
international trade and investment, and hence
impose significant costs on the economy.
Presumably, agents would refrain from
undertaking socially beneficial trade and
investment projects because of the fear that they
would suffer losses when exchange rates move.
Proponents of flexible rates have tended to
minimize the importance of exchange risk as a
barrier to international trade and investment. In
his classic defense of flexible rates, Milton
Friedman states: "Under flexible exchange rates,
traders can almost always protect themselves
against changes in the (exchange) rate by
hedging in a futures market... Any uncertainty
about returns will then be borne by speculators.
The most that can be said ... is that flexible
exchange rates impose a cost of hedging on
traders."
Attempts to settle this debate empirically have
produced disappointing results. This Letter
considers the circumstances under which
exchange risk is "hedgable", that is, when it can
be completely eliminated or neutralized.
The issue of "hedgability" of exchange risk has
important policy and theoretical implications. If
all exchange risks were hedgable, there would
be no harm to the economy from volatility and
uncertainty in foreign exchange markets.
Exchange risk, therefore, would not give
governments cause to attempt to stabilize
exchange rates, and would give even less cause
for pegging rates. Moreover, exchange rate
volatility would not constitute a barrier to
international trade and investment.
At the theoretical level the problem is often just
assumed away, i.e., risks are assumed to be
covered in all cases by a hedge created along
the lines to be described. However, as will also
be discussed, forward coverage eliminates
exchange risk completely only in very special
circumstances. In most cases, it reduces
exchange risk without eliminating it. Whenever
that is the case, exchange rate volatility remains
"harmful" even when hedging tools are
available and widely used by traders and
investors.
How does a hedge work?
How does hedging of exchange risk operate?
Suppose a U.5. exporter expects a payment of 1
million British pounds in 180 days. At that time,
the exporter may convert the pounds into dollars
at the then-prevailing spot exchange rate. The
exporter faces some uncertainty, however, in
that the rate, and hence the dollar value of the
payment, will not be known for 180 days.
To eliminate uncertainty regarding the dollar
value of the future sterling payment, the exporter
may decide to "sell the British pounds forward"
by contracting with most commercial banks to
convert them into dollars at the forward
exchange rate quoted today. Such a forward
contract would obligate the exporter and the
bank to swap dollars for pounds on a specific
date (180 days hence in our example) at a
specified rate of conversion, known as the
forward exchange rate. In general,no funds are
exchanged until the day the contract expires.FABSF
A futures contract purchased through a futures
exchange would be an alternative means of
hedging exchange rate risk. Foreign currency
futures contracts are somewhat similar to
forward contracts, but they tend to be more
uniform, with a limited number of expiration
dates and contract size and with margin
requirements. (Forward contracts are often
contracts "custom-built" according to customer
needs and specifications.) In either case, the
forward (or future) exchange rate can, in
general, be either higher or lower than the
prevailing spot exchange rate, but it is known
and certain in all cases.
In reality, only a small proportion of
international trade is covered by forward or
futures hedging. This may be because traders
can engage in an alternative form of hedging
that is equivalent to forward coverage but could
involve lower transaction costs in some cases.
The exporter can create an equivalent hedge by
borrowing funds in sterling for 180 days against
the funds receivable, and investing the borrowed
funds in a dollar certificate of deposit maturing
in 180 days. In effect, the exporter locks in the
dollar value of the sterling receivables. Similar
hedging tools would be available to importers
who must make payment in foreign currency,
and for some international investors who could
use forward contracts or their equivalents to
hedge against exchange rate risks.
Hedging uncertain amounts
The previous example assumes that the agent
who wishes to hedge exchange rate risk knows
exactly the quantity of foreign exchange to be
received (or paid) at a specified future date and
may then hedge it. But what if the agent does
not? The "total" amount of uncertainty to which
the exporter is exposed is, in a sense, a complex
sum of the two.individual uncertainties-
exchange rate volatility and quantity risk.
An analogy may help illustrate this point. A
hearty employee walking to work on a mid-
western winter's day faces two meteorological
risks that contribute to total "risk": temperature
variations and wind variations. While the walker
could "hedge" the temperature variability by
sticking to sunny exposed streets, those streets
may not necessarily make the best route,
especially if they involve walking through some
wind corridors. Even when he chooses the best
route for walking, any reduction in the general
variability of temperature would make him bet-
ter off, other things remaining equal.
In the same sense, when price and quantity risks
co-exist, exchange risk is not fully hedgable. It
can be shown that even when the quantity of
foreign exchange to be hedged is independent of
exchange risk and the "best" hedging strategy
(the one that minimizes the risk to the agent) is
being used, there will always remain a residual
risk. This residual depends positively on the vari-
ances or degree of uncertainty of both the
exchange rate and the quantity to be hedged.
That is, the residual risk is higher, the greater is
exchange rate volatility. The more volatile is the
exchange rate, the riskier would be the agent's
position, and the less theincentive to trade.
Any stabilization of exchange rates would then
reduce risk, benefit the agent, and expand trade.
If the quantity to be hedged were correlated with
exchange risk, this correlation would also enter
into the calculation, but the basic conclusion
would still hold. The residual risk would be, in a
sense, a hybrid function of each source of uncer-
tainty, and it would depend in particular on
exchange risk. That being the case, exchange
rate volatility would impose a cost on and there-
fore remain a problem for the trader. Its reduc-
tion therefore would benefit the trader.
Hedging and inflation
Now suppose instead that the quantity of foreign
currency to be hedged were known and certain,
but that there were uncertainty in the United
States with respect to inflation rates in the near
future. An. exporter who was due to receive 1
million pounds in 180 days would convert them
through forward coverage into dollars as
described above. He would then know with cer-
tainty what the future nominal dollar value of
that payment would be. But he would not know
its real value (in terms of U.S. purchasing
power), which remains uncertain even with for-
ward coverage. Of course, inflation uncertainty
accompanies domestic trade as well. Neverthe-
less, the total uncertainty of the foreign currency
position would depend on both sources of risk
- inflation and exchange rate volatility - and
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Not only would the payment remain "risky" in
real terms even when a risk-minimizing hedge is
used, but it can be shown that the riskiness
would increase with both exchange rate vol-
atilityand inflation uncertainty. Once again the
stabilization of exchange rates would reduce risk
even for traders and investors who use forward
markets to hedge. Hedging would completely
eliminate exchange risk only if inflation risk
could be totally eliminated. (This could only be
done through trade in financial assets indexed to
the consumer price index.)
Conclusion
In general, exchange risk is completely "hedg-
able" only when there exists no other source of
risk or uncertainty for agents engaged in foreign
exchange transactions. When some other source
of risk exists, "optimal hedging" may reduce
exchange risk but will not in general eliminate
it. Residual risk of hedged positions held by
traders and investors in this circumstance will be
a positive function of exchange rate volatility.
That is, it would increase with increases in
exchange rate volatility.
This is true, as we have seen, whether the other
source of risk is uncertainty over inflation Or the
quantity of foreign currency involved. It would
also hold if the timing of the receipt of a pay-
ment in foreign currency were uncertain (as it
would be for some international investments), if
a forward exchange rate were unavailable for
the date of payment (e.g., because the date isfar
off), and if there were default risk associated
with the foreign exchange receivable.
Since the residual risk for even optimally hedged
positions depends on exchange rate volatility,
the debate over appropriate exchange rate
regimes cannot ignore the impact of exchange
rate volatility on risk. This volatility imposes
costs and therefore deters some trade and
investment.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 208,853 1,169 5,522 2.7
Loans and Leases1 6 183,986 496 1,417 0.7
Commercial and Industrial 51,102 5 1,076 2.1
Real estate 71,904 112 5,172 "7.7
Loans to Individuals 36,986 136 - 4,468 - 10.7
Leases 5,416 - 7 - 178 - 3.1
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 17,642 644 4,741 36.7
OtherSecurities2 7,225 29 - 637 - 8.1
Total Deposits 205,574 - 839 1,337 0.6
Demand Deposits 51,459 - 410 568 1.1
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 35,596 - 1,012 - 11,255 - 24.0
OtherTransaction Balances4 19,657 - 280 2,125 12.1
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 134,458 - 150 - 1,355 - 0.9
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 43,990 - 438 - 2,369 - 5.1
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 31,573 250 - 2,291 - 6.7
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 26,408 2,707 - 969 - 3.5
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings










1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
7 Annualized percent change